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INTRODUCTION:  
ON DEFENDING KANT AT THE AAR
Andrew Chignell
I briefly describe the unusually contentious author-meets-critics session that 
was the origin of the book symposium below. I then try to situate the present 
symposium within broader contemporary scholarship on Kant.
It took a long lifetime for Kant to wash his philosophical 
cloak of many stains and prejudices. But now [in his 
Religion book] he has wantonly slobbered on it with the 
stain of radical evil, just so that Christians, too, might be 
enticed to kiss its hem.
—Goethe, letter to Herder of June 7, 1793
The following book symposium began its life as a panel at the 2009 meet-
ing of the American Academy of Religion. The panel was organized and 
sponsored by the Society of Christian Philosophers at AAR (“SCP@AAR” 
for short) and so it is fitting that the final results would appear in the SCP’s 
flagship journal. In what follows, I’ll briefly describe the SCP@AAR proj-
ect and how this symposium arose from it. I’ll move on to discuss some 
of the strengths of the book under discussion, and situate the exchange 
within recent work on Kant’s philosophy.
I
SCP@AAR aims to sponsor sessions on themes that will (a) appeal to the 
10,000 or so biblical and religion scholars who come to AAR/SBL1 meet-
ings, and (b) showcase the kind of philosophy of religion that is typical of 
SCP regional conferences, SCP meetings at the APA, and Faith and Philoso-
phy itself. The hope is that such cross-pollination will help overcome cul-
tural and sociological differences between “APA” and “AAR” philosophers 
1The annual AAR meeting is usually held conjunctively with the annual meeting of the 
Society of Biblical Literature (SBL). Thus, SCP@AAR tries to offer sessions of philosophi-
cal substance that would be of interest to biblical scholars as well (e.g., on hermeneutics, 
the authority of scripture, and so forth). The sessions are meant, in the words of another 
member of the organizing committee, as “a kind of interdisciplinary invitation for scholars 
across a number of fields in Religious Studies to find resources and wisdom in philosophy 
of religion.”
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of religion, and that the remaining methodological differences will seem 
like less of a barrier to discussion than they have in the past.2
James K. A. Smith and I were on the committee that put together the 
SCP@AAR panel in 2009, but it was Smith who initially suggested that we 
run a panel on a new book by Chris L. Firestone and Nathan Jacobs—In 
Defense of Kant’s Religion.3 The book seemed likely to maximize crossover 
appeal for a number of reasons: it is part of the Indiana Press Philoso-
phy of Religion series edited by Merold Westphal; it features a foreword 
by Nicholas Wolterstorff as well as lengthy discussions of Philip Quinn, 
John Hare, and Allen Wood; the authors are active in both AAR and APA 
circles; and one of them (Jacobs) is actually a trained theologian.
Maximizing crossover appeal was crucial this time around, because 
the infamous 2007 SCP@AAR panel was still fresh in many AAR-going 
minds. That session had devolved into uncomfortable methodological 
sparring, and concluded with a prominent theologian suggesting that 
(analytic) philosophers of religion suffer from a kind of willful naïveté 
or backwardness, as well as an inability to be genuinely inclusive. Her 
final remark was something along the following lines (this is not a direct 
quotation, but rather my memory of the gist, as confirmed with numerous 
attendees afterwards):
Look around the room and you’ll see why the SCP has a mixed reputation 
at the AAR. This is just your typical “Christian philosophy” crowd trans-
planted from the APA: apart from Marilyn McCord Adams and one or two 
other women, it’s a bunch of male, analytic, bearded, and probably theolog-
ically-conservative philosophers. Most of you don’t read modern theology 
or biblical scholarship—in effect ignoring the advances in those disciplines 
over the last sixty years. Most of you seem ignorant of the entire postmod-
ern movement and the way it radically problematizes your appeals to rea-
son, the a priori, “perfect being theology,” and epistemic warrant. And yet 
you presume to come to AAR meetings in order to teach us “sloppy” theo-
logians how to think about God!
This remark was delivered half in jest and half in provocation, but it was 
clear that the underlying sentiment is widespread among AAR members. 
That is why the idea of sponsoring a panel on Kant’s philosophy of religion 
seemed like a stroke of genius: for Kant’s work tends to be held in high esteem 
by people in Religious Studies, Theology, and Philosophy alike.4 Rightly 
or wrongly, most religionists will view the first Critique as the origin 
2For more discussion of these differences, see William Wainwright, ed. God, Philosophy, 
and Academic Culture: A Discussion between Scholars in the AAR and the APA (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1996).
3It would hardly have done for me to suggest this topic, since Kant is my own area of 
specialization as well! Once the decision was made, however, I was happy to chair the 
panel and write this introduction.
4In light of the theologian’s critique cited above, it is perhaps worth noting that another 
advantage of the book is that at least one of the two authors (viz., Jacobs) does not have a 
beard.
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of important arguments against natural theology and an influential kind 
of anti-realism, the second Critique as the source of proto-pragmatist 
“moral proofs,” and Religion as the source of the program—developed by 
the great German theologians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—
to isolate the rational essence of historical religion and render it in the 
language of universalizable morals.
Another consideration in favor of the proposal was that Kant scholars 
in one methodological tradition are often unfamiliar with work by those 
in other traditions—even when they work on the same texts. Thus many 
analytically-trained Kant scholars will not have read Gilles Deleuze’s 
book on the first Critique—a commentary that is seminal in Continental 
and literary circles. A great virtue of In Defense of Kant’s Religion (here-
after “IDKR”) is that it ranges skillfully across many of these boundaries. 
Firestone and Jacobs survey work by commentators in Religious Studies 
(Keith Ward, Vincent McCarthy, Adina Davidovich, Gordon Michalson), 
by analytic philosophers of religion (Philip Quinn, Nicholas Wolterstorff, 
John Hare), and by more traditional historians of philosophy (Allen Wood, 
Stephen Palmquist, Jacqueline Mariňa), all the while writing in a manner 
that is accessible to all.
The goal for the AAR meeting, then, was to pair our authors with crit-
ics from at least some of the relevant scholarly subcultures. At the time, 
Pamela Sue Anderson was working on her book Kant and Theology,5 and 
was thus an ideal candidate. George di Giovanni is the translator of Kant’s 
Religion for Cambridge Press and a distinguished historian of German 
philosophy and religious thought. And Stephen Palmquist is the editor 
and translator of Kant’s Religion for Hackett, as well as a prolific Kantian 
and comparative scholar in the Chinese context.6 Although the panel ex-
pected Palmquist to have strong sympathies with Firestone and Jacobs, 
given their past projects together,7 we were curious to hear what he would 
make of their new variation on the common theme.
As it turned out, there was at least as much controversy at our Kant 
panel as there was at the 2007 meeting, though for somewhat different 
reasons. Anderson came out fiercely opposed to Firestone and Jacobs’s 
talk of our ability to have “pure cognition” of the divine “prototype of hu-
manity.” Professor di Giovanni likened IDKR’s authors to members of the 
rearguard nineteenth-century Jena school: backward-looking Christian 
theologians who wanted to appropriate, and thereby disfigure, the critical 
philosophy for their own apologetical purposes. And far from being the 
5Co-authored with Jordan Bell (New York: Continuum Press, 2010).
6See for instance the recent edition of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy on “Kant and 
China: New Dimensions.” Palmquist guest-edited the volume and also contributed a piece 
called “Architectonic Reasoning and Interpretation in Kant and the Yijing,” Journal of Chi-
nese Philosophy 38:4 (December 2011), 569–584.
7Firestone studied with Palmquist at some point during graduate school, and the two of 
them edited and collaborated with Jacobs on the 2006 book Kant and the New Philosophy of 
Religion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006). 
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friendliest critic, Palmquist delivered such a stinging series of objections 
that one could detect more than a little hurt feeling in the full-throated 
replies that ensued (see below).
Despite these rhetorical fireworks, the session was also very produc-
tive in laying out the stark differences between so-called “traditional” 
interpreters of Kant’s Religion (including Anderson and di Giovanni) and 
“new wave” interpreters (including Palmquist, Jacobs, and Firestone). It 
also revealed some new and significant disagreements amongst the new 
wavers themselves.8 Given all of this, and the sponsorship by SCP@AAR, 
it seemed worth submitting the proceedings to Faith and Philosophy. Before 
doing so, however, Firestone and Jacobs asked Gordon Michalson to add 
a contribution in the hopes that he would be as enthusiastic in his review 
as he had apparently been in earlier correspondence. Michalson agreed to 
the task, but the paper he later sent in also ended up registering more by 
way of opposition than sympathy. Thus Firestone and Jacobs had to go on 
the defensive once again. Fortunately, defense is something at which they 
are by now quite practiced; it is up to the reader to judge whether their 
original defense of Kant, as well as their defense of that defense below, is 
ultimately a success.
II
Since most of the critics below focus on weaknesses rather than strengths, 
it seems worth highlighting, in the rest of this introduction, some of IDKR’s 
virtues. These virtues make it worthy not only of a panel discussion and a 
published symposium, in my view, but also of ongoing attention by people 
interested in Kant’s religious thought—even those who disagree with the 
book’s central theses.
(1) First, Firestone and Jacobs start off with a very helpful three-chapter 
overview of recent trends among English-language commentators.9 It is 
framed, somewhat campily, as a courtroom drama: Kant and his Religion 
book are in the dock while various witnesses come forward with charges 
of incoherence, instability, invalidity, and so on.10 This allows the authors 
to lay out the conundrums in Kant’s Religion relatively well, at least in the 
first two chapters. In the third chapter—devoted to Michalson’s work— 
the metaphor strains: Michalson is depicted as the “star witness in the case 
against Religion” (4) who bursts into the courtroom to deliver a long-winded 
8The reference to them as “new wavers” originates in Keith Yandell, “Who is the True 
Kant?,” Philosophia Christi 9:1 (2007), 81–97.
9The German-language discussion is completely neglected, unfortunately. There is also 
a series of recent French commentaries that would have been worth including in the litera-
ture review (but, on the other hand, life is short and Kant scholarship is exceedingly long). 
Michael Despland provides a nice survey of the French developments in his Foreword to 
Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion.
10One figure even appears in two different incarnations—“early Wood” and “late 
Wood.” This reflects the fact that Allen W. Wood’s views about Kant’s religious thought 
have evolved since their original presentation in Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1970).
148 Faith and Philosophy
“indictment” of Kant, and the reader is left with the sense that his decades-
long and very nuanced interaction with Kant’s thought is being flattened 
out a bit. Still, Michalson’s critique has been very influential, especially in 
Religious Studies circles, and the third chapter of IDKR provides a useful 
(if somewhat cartoonish) synopsis for those who have not read his work. 
The first three chapters alone, then—together with the extensive footnotes 
and Selected Bibliography—will make the book valuable to those seeking 
an overview of the field.
(2) Second, Firestone and Jacobs go on to provide a four-chapter “de-
fense” of Religion: it progressively lays out Kant’s argument in each of 
the four “pieces” (Stücke) of Religion while showing whether and how he 
might respond to charges brought against him by contemporary accusers. 
This linear, stepwise structure makes IDKR an excellent companion for 
people reading Religion for the first time. But the book also fills a gap in 
the scholarly literature: Allen Wood’s classic Kant’s Moral Religion is still 
widely used as a companion, but it is now over forty years old and does 
not go section-by-section in the way that IDKR does. Although there is 
now some competition in the area, and more on the way,11 my sense is that 
the readable and provocative character of IDKR will make it a popular 
choice in courses on Religion for years to come.
(3) Third, Firestone and Jacobs are not reluctant to make eye-popping 
claims, as long as they believe they have the texts to back them. That makes 
for interesting reading, though it can also be a dangerous scholarly strat-
egy: the middling reception they receive in the papers below indicates 
that some experts, at least, were not happy with various details (regard-
ing, especially, their talk of the “pure cognition” of theological truth).12 
Anderson, di Giovanni, and Michalson all accuse our authors of mangling 
Kant’s views in an effort to return to the pre-critical theological tradition 
that Kant was putatively aiming to overthrow. For them it is IDKR, and 
11Palmquist is now writing a commentary of his own on Religion, Lawrence Pasternack 
is working on a Routledge Guide, Gordon Michalson is editing a Cambridge Critical Guide 
and, in Germany, Otfried Höffe has just edited a group commentary on Religion for the 
“Klassiker Auglegen” series. See Immanuel Kant: Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blos-
sen Vernunft, ed. Otfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2010).
12My own sense is that this is largely a terminological issue. No one doubts that Kant 
thinks we can have analytic knowledge of some sort regarding the contents of our concepts. 
This presumably holds for concepts of things-in-themselves as well—i.e., concepts such as 
God, the soul, and the freedom of the will. Firestone and Jacobs emphasize a few pas-
sages in which Kant seems to refer to such awareness as “pure cognition” but, as Anderson 
points out, this is in tension with Kant’s usual way of employing “cognition” (Erkenntnis)—
i.e., as a state or activity that involves intuition of some sort. If Firestone and Jacobs had 
spoken instead about pure “thinking” (Denken), I think they could have had some of what 
they wanted by way of theological/moral content without raising these hackles. If what 
they wanted from “pure cognition,” however, was supposed to be synthetic judgments, then 
they might have avoided controversy by making use of one of the notions of justified belief 
(Glaube) in Kant. For an account of why such belief can’t count as cognition or knowledge, 
see Chignell, “Real Repugnance and Belief about Things-in-themselves,” in Kant’s Moral 
Metaphysics, ed. James Krueger and Benjamin Lipscomb (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010), 
177–210. For the distinction between “thought” and “cognition,” see Critique of Pure Reason 
Bxxiv, note.
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not Kant himself, that ends up “slobbering” too much Christian doctrine 
on the otherwise pure cloak of the critical philosophy.13 Firestone/Jacobs 
fiercely disavow this in their replies below, and emphasize how unortho-
dox and unchristian their Kant really is.
The main reason they cite for regarding Kant this way relates to an-
other of IDKR’s eye-popping claims: namely, that Kant is not referring 
to Jesus of Nazareth in the first three books of Religion when he speaks 
of the perfect “prototype of humanity” who “comes down from heaven” 
to point humanity to the moral truth. Rather, according to Firestone and 
Jacobs, Kant is referring to a kind of Neo-Platonic universal—an idea in 
the divine mind—that we can encounter in “pure cognition” and then use 
as a model for the moral life. This is a bold claim indeed, and it was pre-
sumably what Wolterstorff had in mind when he wrote, in the Foreword, 
that the view propounded in IDKR is “strange, so strange that many of us 
will wonder whether this could really be what Kant had in mind” (xii). 
But, as Wolterstorff points out, Firestone/Jacobs cite a surprising number 
of texts that seem to count in favor of their view, and there are few that 
count decisively against it (though see Palmquist’s essay below). Either 
way, my sense is that if there is one doctrine for which IDKR will be re-
membered, this is it.14
(4) Finally, IDKR is a contribution to the overall effort among a new 
generation of Kant scholars to read the great German philosopher as more 
metaphysically serious—more like a kind of rationalist, really—than has 
been fashionable in recent decades. Advocates of this new “metaphysical 
Kant” would respond to Wolterstorff’s question—“Is it possible and desir-
able for theologians to recover from Kant?”15—by suggesting that it would 
be desirable for theologians (and everyone else, too) to recover from a cer-
tain reading of Kant. In other words, such metaphysical readers encourage 
us to retrieve the sense that transcendental idealism is a genuine idealism, 
and that the noumenal world, for Kant, is not just the empirical world 
considered apart from the “epistemic conditions” under which we hap-
pen to perceive it.16
13The image of a cloak that is “slobbered on” or “soiled” (beschlabbert) is from a letter of 
Goethe’s—see the epigraph above.
14Jacobs defended an earlier version of this view in “Kant’s Prototypical Theology: Tran-
scendental Incarnation as a Rational Foundation for God-Talk,” in Palmquist and Firestone, 
Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, 124–140.
15Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Is it Possible and Desirable for Theologians to Recover from 
Kant?,” Modern Theology 14:1 (1998), 1–18. For a partial response to Wolterstorff, see Chignell, 
“‘As Kant has Shown . . .’: Analytic Theology and the Critical Philosophy,” in Analytic Theol-
ogy, ed. Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea (New York: Oxford, 2009), 117–135.
16The trend over the last few decades has been either to reject the idealism altogether 
and claim that Kant was merely focused on laying out the “epistemic conditions” (Henry 
Allison’s phrase) under which we experience things, or to admit that Kant was indeed an 
idealist about empirical objects but try to focus on other, more palatable aspects of his 
view (this is the strategy employed by P. F. Strawson and Paul Guyer). Note that this is 
orthogonal to the “one world/two world” issue. A metaphysical reading of the sort I’m de-
scribing can be either one-world or two-world and still construe Kant as an idealist about 
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Clearly, much of that story remains to be written, but thanks to this 
book and the discussion it has provoked, Firestone and Jacobs will prob-
ably be a part of it.
Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University
the empirical world. For a one-world but still “metaphysical” reading, see Tobias Rosefeldt, 
“Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten,“ in Kant in der Gegenwart, ed. J. Stolzenberg (Ber-
lin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 167–209, and Lucy Allais, “Kant’s Idealism and the Secondary 
Quality Analogy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:3 (2007), 459–84.
